Internal Set Theory IST\# Based on Hyper Infinitary Logic with Restricted Modus Ponens Rule: Nonconservative Extension of the Model Theoretical NSA

Jaykov Foukzon a

aIsrael Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel.

Author’s contribution

The sole author designed, analyzed, interpreted and prepared the manuscript.

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Abstract

The incompleteness of set theory ZFC leads one to look for natural nonconservative extensions of ZFC in which one can prove statements independent of ZFC which appear to be “true”. One approach has been to add large cardinal axioms. Or, one can investigate second-order expansions like Kelley-Morse class theory, KM or Tarski-Grothendieck set theory TG or It is a nonconservative extension of ZFC and is obtained from other axiomatic set theories by the inclusion of Tarski’s axiom which implies the existence of inaccessible cardinals. See also related set theory with a filter quantifier ZF (aa). In this paper we look at a set theory NC\# \_\_\_\_\_\_ based on bivalent hyper infinitary logic with restricted Modus Ponens Rule. In this paper we deal with set theory NC\# \_\_\_\_\_ based on bivalent hyper infinitary logic with Restricted Modus Ponens Rule. Nonconservative extensions of the canonical internal set theories IST and HST are proposed.

Keywords: Set theory ZFC; nonconservative extension of ZFC; internal set theory IST; external set theory HST; A. Robinson model theoretical NSA; Bivalent hyper infinitary logic; Modus ponens rule; Logic with restricted;modus ponens rule.

*Corresponding author: E-mail: jaykovfoukzon@list.ru;
1 Introduction

The incompleteness of set theory $ZFC$ leads one to look for nonconservative natural extensions of $ZFC$ in which one can prove statements independent of $ZFC$ which appear to be “true”. One approach has been to add large cardinal axioms. Or, one can investigate second-order expansions like Kelley-Morse class theory, $KM$ [1] or Tarski-Grothendieck set theory $TG$ [2]. It is a non-conservative extension of $ZFC$ and is obtained from other axiomatic set theories by the inclusion of Tarski’s axiom which implies the existence of inaccessible cardinals. See also set theory with a filter quantifier $ZF(aa)$ [3], related to set theory with satisfaction predicate. However, nonconservative extensions of $ZFC$ mentioned above related only to pure set theoretical statements. In this paper we look for nonconservative extensions of $ZFC$ in which one can prove statements related to number theory and analysis. In this paper we deal with set theory $NC_{\#\infty}$ based on hyper infinitary logic $2L_{\#\infty}$ with restricted modus ponens rule [4]-[7]. Non trivial applications of the set theory $NC_{\#\infty}$ to transcendental number theory and functional analysis has been recently obtained in my papers [7]-[10]. However, all results obtained in [7]-[10] based on a small part of the set theory $NC_{\#\infty}$ and in fact are obtained using an nonconservative extension of the canonical internal set theory $IST$ [11]-[13]. The main goal of this paper is to present an nonconservative extension $IST_{\#}$ of the canonical internal set theory $IST$. Nonconservative extension of the model theoretical nonstandard analysis also is considered.

2 Set Theory $NC_{\#\infty}$

Set theory $NC_{\#\infty}$ is formulated as a system of axioms based on bivalent hyper infinitary logic $2L_{\#\infty}$ with restricted modus ponens rule [8], see Appendix A. The language of set theory $NC_{\#\infty}$ is a first-order hyper infinitary language $L_{\#\infty}$ with equality $=$, which includes a binary symbol $\in$. We write $x \neq y$ for $(x = y)$ and $x \notin y$ for $(x \in y)$. Individual variables $x, y, z, ...$ of $L_{\#\infty}$ will be understood as ranging over classical sets. The unique existential quantifier $\exists !$ is introduced by writing, for any formula $\phi(x)$, $\exists x \phi(x)$ as an abbreviation of the formula $\exists x [\phi(x) \land \forall y (\phi(y) \Rightarrow x = y)]$. $L_{\#\infty}$ will also allow the formation of terms of the form $x|\phi(x)$ for any formula $\phi$ containing the free variable $x$. Such terms are called non-classical sets; we shall use upper case letters $A, B, ...$ for such sets. For each non-classical set $A = \{x|\phi(x)\}$ the formulas $\forall x [x \in A \iff \phi(x)]$ and $\forall x [x \in A \iff \phi(x, A)]$ is called the defining axioms for the non-classical set $A$.

Remark 2.1. Remind that in logic $2L_{\#\infty}$ with restricted modus ponens rule the statement $\alpha \land (\alpha \Rightarrow \beta)$ does not always guarantee that

$$\alpha, \alpha \Rightarrow \beta \vdash_{RMP} \beta$$

since for some $\alpha$ and $\beta$ possible

$$\alpha, \alpha \Rightarrow \beta \not\vdash_{RMP} \beta$$

even if the statement $\alpha \land (\alpha \Rightarrow \beta)$ holds [8], see Appendix A.

Abbreviation 2.1 We write for the sake of brevity instead (1.1) by

$$\alpha \Rightarrow_{s} \beta$$

(2.3)
and we often write instead (1.2) by
\[ \alpha \Rightarrow w^{\beta} \] (2.4)

**Remark 2.2.** Let \( A \) be a nonclassical set. Note that in set theory \( \text{NC}_{\infty}^# \) the following true formula
\[ \exists A \forall x [x \in A \iff \varphi(x, A)] \] (2.5)
does not always guarantee that
\[ x \in A, x \in A \Rightarrow \varphi(x, A) \vdash_{RMP} \varphi(x, A) \] (2.6)
even if \( x \in A \) holds and (or)
\[ \varphi(x, A), \varphi(x, A) \Rightarrow x \in A \vdash_{RMP} x \in A; \] (2.7)
even \( \varphi(x, A) \) holds, since for nonclassical set \( A \) for some \( y \) possible
\[ y \in A, y \in A \Rightarrow \varphi(y, A) \not\vdash_{RMP} \varphi(y, A) \] (2.8)
and (or)
\[ \varphi(y, A), \varphi(y, A) \Rightarrow y \in A \not\vdash_{RMP} y \in A. \] (2.9)

**Remark 2.3.** Note that in this paper the formulas
\[ \exists a \forall x [x \in a \iff \varphi(x) \land x \in u] \] (2.10)
and more general formulas
\[ \exists a \forall x [x \in a \iff \varphi(x,a) \land x \in u] \] (2.11)
is considered as the defining axioms for the classical set \( a \).

**Remark 2.4.** Let \( a \) be a classical set. Note that in \( \text{NC}_{\infty}^# \): (i) the following true formula
\[ \exists a \forall x [x \in a \iff \varphi(x,a) \land x \in u] \] (2.12)
always guarantee that
\[ x \in a, x \in a \Rightarrow \varphi(x,a) \vdash_{RMP} \varphi(x) \] (2.13)
if \( x \in a \) holds and
\[ \varphi(x), \varphi(x) \Rightarrow x \in a \vdash_{RMP} x \in a; \] (2.14)
if \( \varphi(x) \) holds;
In order to emphasize this fact mentioned above in Remark 2.1-2.3, we rewrite the defining axioms in general case for the nonclassical sets in the following form
\[ \exists A \forall x \{ [x \in A \iff s\varphi(x,A)] \lor [x \in A \iff w\varphi(x,A)] \} \] (2.15)
and similarly we rewrite the defining axioms in general case for the classical sets in the following form
\[ \exists a \forall x [x \in a \iff s\varphi(x) \land (x \in u)] \] (2.16)

**Abbreviation 2.2.** We write instead (2.15):
\[ \forall x \{ [x \in A \iff s_{w}\varphi(x, A)] \} \] (2.17)
We define now the following sets:

\[ x \in_{s,w} A \ \text{iff} \ \forall x \ (x \in A \ \text{and} \ x \in_{s,w} A) \]  

(2.18)

**Definition 2.2.** (1) Two nonclassical sets \( A, B \) are defined to be equal and we write \( A = B \) if \( \forall x [x \in_{s,w} A \iff x \in_{s,w} B] \). (2) \( A \) is a subset of \( B \), and we often write \( A \subseteq_{s,w} B \), if

\[ \forall x [x \in_{s,w} A \implies x \in_{s,w} B] \}. \]

Remark 2.5. CL.Set(\( A \)) asserts that the set \( A \) is a classical set. For any classical set \( u \), it follows from the defining axiom for the classical set \( \{x \mid x \in_u \land \varphi (x)\} \) that

\[ \text{CL.Set(}\{x \mid x \in_u \land \varphi (x)\}) \].

We shall identify \( \{x \mid x \in_u \} \) with \( u \), so that sets may be considered as (special sorts of) nonclassical sets and we may introduce assertions such as \( u \subseteq A, u \subseteq_{s} A \), etc.

**Abbreviation 2.4.** Let \( \varphi(t) \) be a formula of NC\(^\#\)\( \in\). \( \begin{itemize} \item[(i)] \forall x \varphi(x) \) and \( \forall^{\text{CL}} x \varphi(x) \) abbreviates \( \forall x \ (\text{CL.Set}(x) \implies \varphi(x)) \)

\( \item[(ii)] \exists x \varphi(x) \) and \( \exists^{\text{CL}} x \varphi(x) \) abbreviates \( \exists x \ (\text{CL.Set}(x) \implies \varphi(x)) \)

\( \item[(iii)] \forall X \varphi(X) \) and \( \forall^{\text{NCL}} X \varphi(X) \) abbreviates \( \forall X \ (\text{NCL.Set}(X) \implies \varphi(X)) \)

\( \item[(iv)] \exists X \varphi(X) \) and \( \exists^{\text{NCL}} X \varphi(X) \) abbreviates \( \exists X \ (\text{NCL.Set}(X) \implies \varphi(X)) \)
\end{itemize}

**Remark 2.6.** If \( A \) is a nonclassical set, we write \( \exists x \in A \varphi(x, A) \) for \( \exists x [x \in A \land \varphi(x, A)] \) and \( \forall x \in A \varphi(x, A) \) for \( \forall x [x \in A \implies \varphi(x, A)] \).

We define now the following sets:

\begin{enumerate}
\item \( \{u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_n\} = \{x \mid x = u_1 \lor x = u_2 \lor \ldots \lor x = u_n\} \).
\item \( \{A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_n\} = \{x \mid x = A_1 \lor x = A_2 \lor \ldots \lor x = A_n\} \).
\item \( A \cap A = \{x \mid y \in A \implies x = y\} \).
\item \( A \cup A = \{x \mid x \in A \lor x \in B\} \).
\item \( A \cap B = \{x \mid x \in A \land x \in B\} \).
\item \( A - B = \{x \mid x \in A \land x \notin B\} \).
\item \( A \cup B = \{x \mid x \in A \lor x \notin B\} \).
\item \( \phi(A) = \{x \mid x \in A\} \).
\item \( \text{Universal Set: NCL.Set}(V) \).
\end{enumerate}

**Empty Set:** CL.Set(\( \emptyset \))

**Pairing:** CL.Set(\( \{u, v\} \))

**Extensionality:** 1: \( \forall u \forall v (\forall x (x \in u \iff x \in v) \implies u = v) \)

**Pairing:** 2: \( \forall A \forall B \text{NCL.Set}(\{A, B\}) \)

**Union:** 1: \( \forall u \text{CL.Set}(\cup u) \)

**Union:** 2: \( \forall A \text{NCL.Set}(\cup A) \)

**Power Set:** 1: \( \forall u \text{CL.Set}(P(u)) \)
Def. 2.10. Two sets $F\subseteq F_x$ implies Def. 2.8.

The identity map Def. 2.7.

Given two functions Def. 2.6.

We write Def. 2.5.

A binary relation between two nonclassical sets $A, B$ Def. 2.4.

We define the Cartesian product of two nonclassical sets $A$ and $B$ Def. 2.3.

The ordered pair of two sets $u, v$ is defined as usual by

$$\langle u, v \rangle = \{ \{u\}, \{u, v\} \} \tag{2.19}$$

Def. 2.4. We define the Cartesian product of two nonclassical sets $A$ and $B$ as usual by

$$A \times_{s,w} B = \{ (x, y) \mid x \in_{s,w} A \land y \in_{s,w} B \} \tag{2.20}$$

Def. 2.5. A binary relation between two nonclassical sets $A, B$ is a subset $R \subseteq_{s,w} A \times_{s,w} B$. We also write $aR_b$ for $a, b \in_{s,w} R$. The domain $\text{dom}(R)$ and the range $\text{ran}(R)$ of $R$ are defined by

$$\text{dom}(R) = \{ x \mid \exists y (xR_y) \}, \text{ran}(R) = \{ y \mid \exists x (xR_y) \} \tag{2.21}$$

Def. 2.6. A relation $F_{s,w}$ is a function, or map, written $\text{Fun}(F_{s,w})$, if for each $a \in_{s,w} \text{dom}(F)$ there is a unique $b$ for which $aF_{s,w}b$. This unique $b$ is written $F(a)$ or $Fa$.

We write $F_{s,w} : A \rightarrow B$ for the assertion that $F_{s,w}$ is a function with $\text{dom}(F_{s,w}) = A$ and $\text{ran}(F_{s,w}) = B$. In this case we write $a \mapsto F_{s,w}(a)$ for $F_{s,w}a$.

Def. 2.7. The identity map $1_A$ on $A$ is the map $A \rightarrow A$ given by $a \mapsto a$.

If $X \subseteq_{s,w} A$, the map $x \mapsto x : X \rightarrow A$ is called the insertion map of $X$ into $A$.

Def. 2.8. If $F_{s,w} : A \rightarrow B$ and $X \subseteq_{s,w} A$, the restriction $F_{s,w}|X$ of $F_{s,w}$ to $X$ is the map $X \rightarrow A$ given by $x \mapsto F_{s,w}(x)$. If $Y \subseteq_{s,w} B$, the inverse image of $Y$ under $F_{s,w}$ is the set

$$F_{s,w}^{-1}[Y] = \{ x \in_{s,w} A : F_{s,w}(x) \in_{s,w} Y \} \tag{2.22}$$

Given two functions $F_{s,w} : A \rightarrow B, G_{s,w} : B \rightarrow C$, we define the composite function $G_{s,w} \circ F_{s,w} : A \rightarrow C$ to be the function $a \mapsto G_{s,w}(F_{s,w}(a))$. If $F_{s,w} : A \rightarrow A$, we write $F_{s,w}^2$ for $F_{s,w} \circ F_{s,w}$.

Def. 2.9. A function $F_{s,w} : A \rightarrow B$ is said to be monic if for all $x, y \in_{s,w} A$, $F_{s,w}(x) = F_{s,w}(y)$ implies $x = y$, epic if for any $b \in_{s,w} B$ there is a $a \in_{s,w} A$ for which $b = F_{s,w}(a)$, and bijective, or a bijection, if it is both monic and epic. It is easily shown that $F_{s,w}$ is bijective if and only if $F_{s,w}$ has an inverse, that is, a map $G_{s,w} : B \rightarrow A$ such that $F_{s,w} \circ G_{s,w} = 1_B$ and $G_{s,w} \circ F_{s,w} = 1_A$.

Def. 2.10. Two sets $X$ and $Y$ are said to be equipollent, and we write $X \cong_{s,w} Y$, if there is a bijection between them.
Definition 2.11. Suppose we are given two sets $I, A$ and an epi map $F_{s,w} : I \to A$.

Then $A = \{ F_{s,w}(i) | i \in I \}$ and so, if, for each $i \in s_w I$, we write $a_i$ for $F_{s,w}(i)$, then $A$ can be presented in the form of an indexed set $\{ a_i : i \in s_w I \}$. If $A$ is presented as an indexed set of sets $\{ X_i | i \in s_w I \}$, then we write $\bigcup_{i \in I} X_i$ and $\bigcap_{i \in I} X_i$ for $\cup A$ and $\cap A$, respectively.

Definition 2.12. The projection maps $\pi_1 : A \times s_w B \to A$ and $\pi_2 : A \times s_w B \to B$ are defined to be the maps $< a, b > \mapsto a$ and $< a, b > \mapsto b$ respectively.

Definition 2.13. For sets $A, B$, the exponential $B^A$ is defined to be the set of all functions from $A$ to $B$.

2.1 Axiom of nonregularity

Remind that a non-empty set $u$ is called regular iff $\forall x [x \neq \emptyset \rightarrow (\exists y \in x)(x \cap y \neq \emptyset)]$.

Let’s investigate what it says: suppose there were a non-empty $x$ such that $(\forall y \in x)(x \cap y \neq \emptyset)$. For any $z_1 \in x$ we would be able to get $z_2 \in z_1 \cap x$. Since $z_2 \in x$ we would be able to get $z_3 \in z_2 \cap x$. The process continues forever: $\ldots \in z_{n+1} \in z_n \ldots \in z_4 \in z_3 \in z_2 \in z_1 \in x$. Thus if we don’t wish to rule out such an infinite regress we forced accept the following statement:

$$\exists x [x \neq \emptyset \rightarrow (\forall y \in x)(x \cap y \neq \emptyset)] \quad (2.23)$$

2.2 Axiom of hyperinfinite

Definition 2.14. (i) A non-empty transitive non regular set $u$ is a well formed non regular set iff:

(i) there is unique countable sequence $\{ u_n \}_{n=1}^{\infty}$ such that

$$\ldots \in u_{n+1} \in u_n \ldots \in u_4 \in u_3 \in u_2 \in u_1 \in u \quad (2.24)$$

(ii) for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and any $u_{n+1} \in u_n$:

$$u_n = u_{n+1}^+ = \quad (2.25)$$

where $a^+ = a \cup \{ a \}$.

(ii) we define a function $a^{+[k]}$ inductively by $a^{+[k+1]} = (a^{+[k]})^+$.

Definition 2.15. Let $u$ and $w$ are well formed non regular sets. We write $w < u$ iff for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$

$$w \in u_n. \quad (2.26)$$

Definition 2.16. We say that an well formed non regular set $u$ is infinite (or hyperfinite) hypernatural number iff:

(I) For any member $w \in u$ one and only one of the following conditions are satified:

(i) $w \in \mathbb{N}$ or

(ii) $w = u_n$ for some $n \in \mathbb{N}$ or

(iii) $w < u$.

(II) Let $\prec_u$ be a set $\prec_u = \{ z | z < u \}$, then by relation $\prec$ a set $\prec u$ is densely ordered with no first element.

(III) $\mathbb{N} \subset u$.

Definition 2.17. Assume $u \in \mathbb{N}^\#$, then $u$ is infinite (hypernatural) number if $u \in \mathbb{N}^\# \setminus \mathbb{N}$.
Axiom of hyperinfinity
There exists a set $\mathbb{N}^#$ such that:
(i) $\mathbb{N} \subset \mathbb{N}^#$,
(ii) if $u \in \mathbb{N}^# \setminus \mathbb{N}$ then there exists infinite (hypernatural) number $v$ such that $v \prec u$,
(iii) if $u \in \mathbb{N}^# \setminus \mathbb{N}$ then there exists infinite (hypernatural) number $w$ such that for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$: $u + [n] \prec w$,
(iv) set $\mathbb{N}^# \setminus \mathbb{N}$ is partially ordered by relation $(\cdot, \cdot)$ with no first and no last element.

3 Hypernaturals $\mathbb{N}^#$
In this section nonstandard arithmetic $\mathbb{A}^#$ related to hypernaturals $\mathbb{N}^#$ is considered axiomatically.

3.1 Axioms of the nonstandard arithmetic $\mathbb{A}^#$ are:

Axiom of hyperinfinity
There exists unique set $\mathbb{N}^#$ such that:
(i) $\mathbb{N} \subset \mathbb{N}^#$,
(ii) if $u$ is infinite (hypernatural) number then there exists infinite (hypernatural) number $v$ such that $v \prec u$,
(iii) if $u$, $w$ is infinite hypernatural number then there exists infinite (hypernatural) number $w$ such that $u \prec w$,
(iv) set $\mathbb{N}^# \setminus \mathbb{N}$ is partially ordered by relation $(\cdot, \cdot)$ with no first and no last element.

Axioms of infinite $\omega$-induction
(i) $\forall S (\mathbb{N} \subset S) \left\{ \bigwedge_{n \in \omega} (n \in S \implies \_n^+ \in S) \implies \_S = \mathbb{N} \right\} (3.27)$
(ii) Let $F (x)$ be a wff of the set theory $\mathbb{NC}^#_{\omega \infty}$, then

$\left[ \bigwedge_{n \in \omega} (F (n) \implies \_F (n^+)) \right] \implies \_\forall n (n \in \omega) F (n) (3.28)$

Definition 3.1(i) Let $\beta$ be a hypernatural such that $\beta \in \mathbb{N}^# \setminus \mathbb{N}$. Let $[0, \beta] \subset \mathbb{N}^#$ be a set such that $\forall x \in [0, \beta] \iff 0 \leq x \leq \beta$ and let $[0, \beta] = [0, \beta] \setminus \{ \beta \}$.

(ii) Let $\beta \in \mathbb{N}^# \setminus \mathbb{N}$ and let $\beta_\infty \subset \mathbb{N}^#$ be a set such that

$\forall x \left\{ x \in \beta_\infty \iff \exists k (k \geq 0) \left[ 0 \leq x \leq \beta^{+[k]} \right] \right\} (3.29)$

Definition 3.2. Let $F (x)$ be a wff of $\mathbb{NC}^#_{\omega \infty}$ with unique free variable $x$. We will say that a wff $F (x)$ is restricted on a classical set $S$ such that $S \subset \mathbb{N}^# \setminus \mathbb{N}$ iff the following condition is satisfied

$\forall \alpha \left[ \alpha \in \mathbb{N}^# \setminus S \implies \_\neg F (\alpha) \right] (3.30)$

Definition 3.3. Let $F (x)$ be a wff of $\mathbb{NC}^#_{\omega \infty}$ with unique free variable $x$. We will say that a wff $F (x)$ is strictly restricted on a set $S$ such that $S \subset \mathbb{N}^# \setminus \mathbb{N}$ iff there is no proper subset $S' \subset S$ such that a wff $F (x)$ is restricted on a set $S'$.
Example 3.1. (i) Let $\text{fin}(\alpha), \alpha \in \mathbb{N}^\#$ be a wff formula such that $\text{fin}(\alpha) \iff \alpha \in \mathbb{N}$. Observe that $\forall \alpha [\alpha \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \mathbb{N} \implies \text{fin}(\alpha)]$.

Let $h\text{fin}(\alpha), \alpha \in \mathbb{N}^\#$ be a wff formula such that $h\text{fin}(\alpha) \iff \alpha \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \mathbb{N} \implies \alpha \notin \text{fin}(\alpha)$.

Definition 3.4. Let $F(x)$ be a wff of $\mathbf{NC}_{\mathbb{N}}^\#$ with unique free variable $x$. We will say that a wff $F(x)$ is unrestricted if $wff F(x)$ is not restricted on any set $S$ such that $S \subseteq \mathbb{N}^\#$.

**Axiom of hyperfinite induction 1**

$$\forall S (S \subseteq [0, \beta]) \forall \beta (\beta \in \mathbb{N}^\#) \left\{ \forall \alpha (\alpha \in [0, \beta)] \left[ \bigwedge_{0 \leq \alpha \leq \beta} (\alpha \in S \implies \alpha^+ \in S) \right] \implies S = [0, \beta] \right\}. \quad (3.31)$$

**Axiom of hyperfinite induction 1′**

$$\forall S (S \subseteq [0, \beta_\infty]) \forall \beta (\beta \in \mathbb{N}^\#) \left\{ \forall \alpha (\alpha \in [0, \beta_\infty)] \left[ \bigwedge_{0 \leq \alpha \leq \beta_\infty} (\alpha \in S \implies \alpha^+ \in S) \right] \implies S = [0, \beta_\infty] \right\}. \quad (3.32)$$

**Axiom of hyper infinite induction 1**

$$\forall S (S \subseteq \mathbb{N}^\#) \left\{ \forall \beta (\beta \in \mathbb{N}^\#) \left[ \bigwedge_{0 \leq \alpha \leq \beta} (\alpha \in S \implies \alpha^+ \in S) \right] \implies S = \mathbb{N}^\# \right\}. \quad (3.33)$$

Definition 3.5. A set $S \subseteq \mathbb{N}^\#$ is a hyper inductive if the following statement holds

$$\bigwedge_{\alpha \in \mathbb{N}^\#} (\alpha \in S \implies \alpha^+ \in S) \quad (3.34)$$

Obviously a set $\mathbb{N}^\#$ is a hyper inductive. Thus axiom of hyper infinite induction 1 asserts that a set $\mathbb{N}^\#$ this is the smallest hyper inductive set.

**Axioms of hyperfinite induction 2**

Let $F(x)$ be a wff of the set theory $\mathbb{NC}_{\mathbb{N}}^\#$ strictly restricted on a set $[0, \beta]$ then

$$\forall \beta (\beta \in [0, \beta]) \left[ \bigwedge_{0 \leq \alpha \leq \beta} (F(\alpha) \implies \alpha F(\alpha^+)) \right] \implies \forall \alpha (\alpha \in [0, \beta]) F(\alpha) \quad (3.35)$$

Let $F(x)$ be a wff of the set theory $\mathbb{NC}_{\mathbb{N}}^\#$ strictly restricted on a set $[0, \beta_\infty]$ then

$$\forall \beta (\beta \in [0, \beta_\infty]) \left[ \bigwedge_{0 \leq \alpha \leq \beta_\infty} (F(\alpha) \implies \alpha F(\alpha^+)) \right] \implies \forall \alpha (\alpha \in [0, \beta_\infty]) F(\alpha) \quad (3.36)$$

**Axiom of hyper infinite induction 2**

Let $F(x)$ be an unrestricted wff of the set theory $\mathbb{NC}_{\mathbb{N}}^\#$ then

$$\forall \beta (\beta \in \mathbb{N}^\#) \left[ \bigwedge_{0 \leq \alpha \leq \beta} (F(\alpha) \implies \alpha F(\alpha^+)) \right] \implies \forall \beta (\beta \in \mathbb{N}^\#) F(\beta) \quad (3.37)$$

The main restricted rules of conclusion.

If $A^\# \vdash A \rightarrow \forall B \in \mathbb{N} \implies B \in \mathbb{N}^\#$. Thus if statement $A$ holds in $A^\#$ we cannot obtain from $\neg A$ by restricted rules of conclusion any formula $B \in \mathbb{N}^\#$ whatsoever.
3.2 The generalized recursion theorem

**Theorem 3.1.** Let $S$ be a set, $c \in S$ and $G : S \to S$ is any function with $\text{dom}(G) = S$ and $\text{range}(G) \subseteq S$. Let $W[G] \in \mathbb{N}^\# \times S$ be a binary relation such that:
(a) $(1, c) \in W[G]$ and (b) if $(x, y) \in W[G]$ then $(Sc(x), G(y)) \in W[G]$.
Then there exists a function $F : \mathbb{N}^\# \to S$ such that: (i) $\text{dom}(F) = \mathbb{N}^\#$ and $\text{range}(F) \subseteq S$; (ii) (1) $c$ for all $x \in \mathbb{N}^\#$, $(Sc(x)) = G((x))$.

The desired function is a certain hyper inductive binary relation $W \subseteq \mathbb{N}^\# \times S$.

It is to have the properties:

(ii) $(1, c) \in W$ for all $x \in \mathbb{N}^\#$, if $(x, y) \in W$ then $(Sc(x), G(y)) \in W$.

**Remark 3.1.** The latter is just another way of expressing (iii), that for all $x \in \mathbb{N}^\#$

$$
F(x) = y 
$$

then

$$
(Sc(x)) = G(y)
$$

**Remark 3.2.** Note that any relation $W$ mentioned above is a hyper inductive relation since the hyper inductivity conditions (ii')-(iii') are satisfied.

However there are many hyper inductive relations which satisfy the conditions (ii')-(iii')-ii' ; on such is $\mathbb{N}^\# \times S$. What distinguishes the desired function from all these other hyper inductive relations is that we want $(a, b)$ to be on it only as required by (ii') and (iii'). In other words, it is to be the smallest hyper inductive relation satisfying (ii')-(iii'). This can be expressed precisely as follows:

(1) Let $M$ be a set of the hyper inductive relations $W$ satisfying the conditions (ii') and (iii'); then we define a set $= \bigcap_{W \in M} W$. Hence (2) whenever $W \in M$ then $\subseteq W$.

We shall now show that we can derived from (1) that is also one hyper inductive relation in $M$.(3) $(1, c) \in \in$.

This follows immediately from the definition of $\bigcap_{W \in M}$ and the fact that $(1, c) \in W$ for all $W \in M$.(4) If $(x, y) \in \in (Sc(x), G(y))$. For if $(x, y) \in \in (x, y) \in W$ for all $W \in M$; hence by (iii') $(Sc(x), G(y)) \in W$ for all $W \in M$ so that $(Sc(x), G(y)) \in$. We must now verify that is actually a function, i.e., we wish to show that for any $x, z_1, z_2 \in \mathbb{N}^\#$, if $(x, z_1) \in$ and $(x, z_2) \in$, then $z_1 = z_2$.

We shall prove this by hyper infinite induction on $x$. Let (5) $A = \{x \mid x \in \mathbb{N}^\# \text{ and for all } z_1, z_2 \in \mathbb{N}^\#, \text{ if } (x, z_1) \in \text{ and } (x, z_2) \in \text{then } z_1 = z_2\}$.

We shall show $A = \mathbb{N}^\#$ by applying hyper infinite induction. First we have (6) $1 \in A$.

To prove (6), it suffices to show that for any $z$, if $(1, z) \in$ then $z = c$.

We prove this by contradiction; in other words, suppose to the contrary that there is some $z$ with $(1, z) \in$ but $z \neq c$. Consider the hyper inductive relation $W = \{1, z\}$.

Since $(1, c) \in$ and $(1, c) \neq (1, z)$, it follows that $(1, c) \in W$. Moreover, whenever $(u, y) \in W$ then $(u, y) \in$ and hence $(Sc(u), G(y)) \in$ but $Sc(u) \neq 1$, so $(Sc(u), G(y)) \neq (1, z)$, and hence
(c(u), G(y)) ∈ W. Thus W satisfies both conditions (ii') and (iii'); in other words, W ∈ M. But then it follows from (2) that ⊆ W however this is clearly false since (1, z) ∈ (1, z) ∈ W. Thus our hypothesis has led us to a contradiction, and hence (6) is proved. Next we show that (7) for any x ∈ N# if x ∈ A then Sc(x) ∈ A.

Suppose that x ∈ A, so that whenever (x, z_1) ∈ and (x, z_2) ∈ then z_1 = z_2. We must show that whenever (Sc(x), w_1) ∈ and (Sc(x), w_2) ∈ then w_1 = w_2. To prove this, it suffices to show that (8) whenever (Sc(x), w) ∈ then there exists a z with w = G(z) and (x, z) ∈ .

For if (8) is true, we would have for the given w_1, w_2 some z_1 = z_2 with w_1 = G(z_1) = w_2 = G(z_2), (x, z_1) ∈ and (x, z_2) ∈ . Then, since x ∈ A, z_1 = z_2 and hence G(z_1) = G(z_2), that is, w_1 = w_2.

Now to prove (8) suppose, to the contrary, that it is not true; in other words, suppose that we have some w with (Sc(x), w) ∈ but such that for all z such that (z, x) ∈ we have w = G(z). Consider the hyper inductive relation W = \{Se(x), w)\}. We shall show that W ∈ M. First of all (1, c) and (1, c) ≠ (Sc(x), w); hence, (1, c) ∈ W. Suppose that (u, y) ∈ W; then (u, y) ∈ and (Sc(u), G(y)) ∈ .

Clearly if u ≠ x then (Sc(u), G(y)) ≠ (Sc(x), w), so that in this case (Sc(u), G(y)) ∈ W. On the other hand, if u = x = (Sc(u), G(y)) = (Sc(x), w), then w = G(y), where (x, y) ∈ contrary to the choice of w since (Sc(x), w) ∈ . Thus whenever (u, y) ∈ W, we see by (2) that ⊆ W, but this is false since (Sc(x), w) ∈ and (Sc(x), w) ∈ W. Thus our hypothesis that (8) is incorrect has led to a contradiction, and hence (8) is proved. Since (7) follows from (8), we have by hyper infinite induction from (6) that A = N#. Hence (9) is a function.

We have still to prove that satisfies condition (i); we must show that for each x ∈ N# there is a y with (x, y) ∈ . Since ⊆ N# × S, it will then follow that dom() = N# and range() ⊆ S. Let B = dom(), that is, (10) B = \{x|x ∈ N# and for some y, (x, y) ∈ \).

We prove now by hyper infinite induction that B = N#. First, 1 ∈ B, since (1, c) ∈ by (3). Next, if x ∈ B, pick some y with (x, y) ∈ ; then by (4), (Sc(x), G(y)) ∈ , and hence Sc(x) ∈ B.

Thus concludes the first part of the proof, that there is at least one function satisfying conditions (i)-(iii).

**Part 2.** We prove that there cannot be more than one such function. Suppose that 1 and 2 both satisfy the conditions (i)-(iii) we wish to show 1 = 2, i.e., that for all x ∈ N# \{x = 2 (x). Thus is proved by hyper infinite induction on X. By (ii), 1(1) = c and 2(1) = c, so 1(1) = 2(1). Suppose that 1(x) = 2 (x); then 1(Sc(x)) = G_1 (x) and 2(Sc(x)) = G_2 (x), so 1(Sc(x)) = 2(Sc(x)).

**Theorem 3.2.** Let S be a set, c ∈ S and G : S × N# → S is a binary function with dom(G) = S × N# and range(G) ⊆ S.

Then there exists a function : N# → S such that:

(i) dom() = N# and range() ⊆ S; (ii) 1 = c for all x ∈ N#, (Sc(x)) = G((x), x).

We omit the proof of Theorem 3.2 since it can be given by simple modification of the proof to Theorem 3.1.
Nonconservative Extension of the Model Theoretical NSA

Remind that Robinson nonstandard analysis (RNA) many developed using set-theoretical objects called superstructures \[14\]-\[17\]. A superstructure \(V(S)\) over a set \(S\) is a set defined by the following way:
\[
V_0(S) = S, V_{n+1}(S) = V_n(S) \cup (P(V_n(S)), V(S) = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} V_n(S). \tag{4.40}
\]
Superstructures of the empty set consist of sets of infinite rank in the cumulative hierarchy and therefore do not satisfy the infinity axiom. Making \(S = \mathbb{R}\) will suffice for virtually any construction necessary in analysis.

Bounded formulas are formulas where all quantifiers occur in the form
\[
\forall x (x \in y \implies \cdots), \exists x (x \in y \implies \cdots) \tag{4.41}
\]
A nonstandard embedding is a mapping
\[
* : V(X) \to V(Y) \tag{4.42}
\]
from a superstructure \(V(X)\) called the standard universum, into another superstructure \(V(Y)\), called nonstandard universum, satisfying the following postulates:

1. \(Y = * X\)
2. **Transfer Principle.** For every bounded formula \(\Phi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)\) and elements \(a_1, \ldots, a_n \in V(X)\), the property \(\Phi\) is true for \(a_1, \ldots, a_n\) in the standard universum if and only if it is true for \(*a_1, \ldots, *a_n\) in the nonstandard universum:
\[
(V(X), \in) \models \Phi (a_1, \ldots, a_n) \iff (V(Y), \in) \models \Phi (*a_1, \ldots, *a_n) \tag{4.43}
\]
3. **Non-triviality.** For every infinite set \(A\) in the standard universum, the set \(\{ *a \mid a \in A\}\) is a proper subset of \(*A\)

**Definition 4.1.** \[17\] A set \(x\) is internal if and only if \(x\) is an element of \(*A\) for some element \(A\) of \(V(\mathbb{R})\). Let \(X\) be a set with \(A = \{A_i\}_{i \in I}\) a family of subsets of \(X\). Then the collection \(A\) has the infinite intersection property, if any infinite subcollection \(J \subset I\) has non-empty intersection. Nonstandard universum is \(\kappa\)-saturated if whenever \(\{A_i\}_{i \in I}\) is a collection of internal sets with the infinite intersection property and the cardinality of \(I\) is less than or equal to \(\kappa\), \(i \in I A_i \neq \emptyset\).

**Remark 4.1.** Remind that: (i) for each standard universum \(U = V(X)\) there exists canonical language \(\equiv\), (ii) for each nonstandard universum \(W = V(Y)\) there exists corresponding canonical nonstandard language \(* \equiv W\) \[17\].

**3**. The restricted rules of conclusion.

If \(W \models A\) then \(\neg A \not\models B\), where \(B \in \wedge B \in *\)

Thus if \(A\) holds in \(W\) we cannot obtain from \(\neg A\) any formula \(B\) whatsoever.

**Remark 4.2.** We write \(* \models A\) instead \(W \models A\).

**Definition 4.2.** \[6\]-\[7\]. A set \(S \subset \mathbb{N}\) is a hyper inductive if the following statement holds
\[
\bigwedge_{\beta \in \mathbb{N}} (\alpha + \beta \in S) \implies (\alpha + \beta \in S) \tag{4.44}
\]
where $\alpha^+ \triangleq \alpha + 1$. Obviously a set $\mathbb{N}$ is a hyper inductive. As we see later there is just one hyper inductive subset of $\mathbb{N}$, namely $\mathbb{N}$ itself.

In this paper we apply the following hyper inductive definitions of a set $[6]-[7]$

\[
\exists S \forall \beta \left( \beta \in S \iff \forall \alpha \left( \alpha \in S \implies \alpha^+ \in S \right) \right) \quad (4.45)
\]

We extend up Robinson nonstandard analysis (RNA) by adding the following postulate:

4. Any hyper inductive set $S$ is internal.

Remark 4.1. The statement 4 is not provable in ZFC but provable in a set theory $\text{NC}^\#_{\infty, \#}$, see.

Thus postulates 1-4 gives an nonconservative extension of RNA and we denote such extension by NERNA.

Remark 4.2. Note that NERNA of course based on the same hyper infinitary logic with Restricted Modus Ponens Rule as a set theory $\text{NC}^\#_{\infty, \#}$.

Remind that in RNA the following induction principle holds.

Theorem 4.1.[17]. Assume that $S \subset \mathbb{N}$ is internal set, then

\[
(1 \in S) \land \forall x [x \in S \implies x + 1] \implies S = \mathbb{N} \quad (4.46)
\]

In NERNA Theorem 4.1 also holds.

Remark 4.3. It follows from postulate 4 and Theorem 3.1 that any hyper inductive set $S$ is equivalent to $\mathbb{N} : S = \mathbb{N}$

Remark 4.4. Note that the following statement is provable in $\text{NC}^\#_{\infty, \#}$:

4' Axiom of hyper infinite induction

\[
\forall S (S \subset \mathbb{N}) \left\{ \forall \beta \left( \beta \in \mathbb{N} \right) \left[ \forall \alpha \left( \alpha \in S \implies \alpha^+ \in S \right) \right] \implies S = \mathbb{N} \right\}. \quad (4.47)
\]

Thus postulate 4 of the theory NERNA is provable in $\text{NC}^\#_{\infty, \#}$.

Rules of conclusion

MRR (Main Restricted rule of conclusion)

Let $\varphi(x)$ be a wff with one free variable $x$ and such that $(n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \mathbb{N}) \land \mathbb{V}(Y) \models \varphi(n)$, then $\neg \varphi(n) \not\in B$, i.e., if statement $A$ holds in $\mathbb{V}(Y)$ we cannot obtain from $\neg A$ any formula $B$ whatsoever.

Remark 4.5. The MRR is necessarily in natural way, since by assumption $\neg \varphi(n)$ one obtains directly the apparent contradiction $\varphi(n) \land \neg \varphi(n)$ from which by unrestricted modus ponens rule (UMPR) one obtains $\varphi(n) \land \neg \varphi(n) \not\in UMP\text{R} B$.

Example 4.1. Remind the proof of the following statement: structure $(\mathbb{N}, <)$ is a well-ordered set.

Proof. Let $X$ be a nonempty subset of $\mathbb{N}$. Suppose $X$ does not have a $<$-least element. Then consider the set $\mathbb{N} \setminus X$.

Case (1) $\mathbb{N} \setminus X = \emptyset$. Then $X = \mathbb{N}$ and so 0 is a $<$-least element. Contradiction.

Case (2) $\mathbb{N} \setminus X \neq \emptyset$. Then 1 $\in \mathbb{N} \setminus X$ otherwise 1 is a $<$-least element. Contradiction.

Case (3) $\mathbb{N} \setminus X \neq \emptyset$. Assume now that there exists an $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus X$ such that $n \neq 1$. 

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Since we have supposed that $X$ does not have a least element, thus $n + 1 \notin X$.

Thus we see that for all $n : n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus X$ implies that $n + 1 \in \mathbb{N} \setminus X$. We can conclude by induction that $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus X$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Thus $\mathbb{N} \setminus X = \emptyset$.

This is a contradiction to $X$ being a nonempty subset of $\mathbb{N}$.

We set now $X_1 = \mathbb{N} \setminus \mathbb{N}$, thus $\mathbb{N} \setminus X_1 = \mathbb{N}$.

In contrast with a set $X$ the assumption $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus X_1$ implies that $n + 1 \in \mathbb{N} \setminus X_1$ if and only if $n$ is finite, since for any infinite $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus X$ the assumption $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus X_1$ contradicts with a true statement $V(Y) \models n \notin \mathbb{N} \setminus X_1 = \mathbb{N}$ and therefore in accordance with MRR we cannot obtain from $n \notin \mathbb{N} \setminus X_1$ any formula $B$ whatsoever.

5 IST# and BST#

The axiomatics IST (Internal Set Theory) was presented in 1977 [11] and in a sense formulates within first-order language the behaviour of standard and internal sets of a nonstandard model of ZFC. This were done by adding the unary standardness predicate "st" to the language of ZFC as well as adding to the axioms of ZFC three new axiom schemes involving the predicate "st" Idealization, Standardization and Transfer.

Remark 5.1. Formulas which do not use the predicate st are called internal formulas (or \(\in\)-formulas) and formulas that use this new predicate are called external formulas (or st-\(\in\)-formulas). A formula $\varphi$ is standard if only standard constants occur in $\varphi$.

Abbreviation 5.2. We denote a set of all naturals by $\mathbb{N}^*$ and a set of all finite naturals by $\mathbb{N}$.

Abbreviation 5.2. We write $\text{fin}(x)$ meaning 'x is finite'. Let $\varphi(x)$ be a st-\(\in\)-formula:

1. \(\forall^\text{st} x \varphi(x)\) abbreviates $\forall x (\text{st}(x) \Rightarrow \varphi(x))$.
2. \(\exists^\text{st} x \varphi(x)\) abbreviates $\exists x (\text{st}(x) \land \varphi(x))$.
3. \(\forall^\text{fin} x \varphi(x)\) abbreviates $\forall x (\text{fin}(x) \Rightarrow \varphi(x))$.
4. \(\exists^\text{fin} x \varphi(x)\) abbreviates $\exists x (\text{fin}(x) \land \varphi(x))$.
5. \(\forall^\text{stfin} x \varphi(x)\) abbreviates $\forall x (\text{st}(x) \land \text{fin}(x) \Rightarrow \varphi(x))$.
6. \(\exists^\text{stfin} x \varphi(x)\) abbreviates $\exists x (\text{st}(x) \land \text{fin}(x) \land \varphi(x))$.

The fundamental axioms of IST:

(I) Idealization

\[
\forall^\text{stfin} F \forall x \in F [R(x, y) \iff \exists y \forall^\text{st} x R(x, b)]
\]  \hspace{1cm} (5.48)

for any internal relation $R$.

Remark 5.2. The idealization axiom obviously states that saying that for any fixed finite set $F$ there is a $y$ such that $R(x, y)$ holds for all $x \in F$ is the same as saying that there is a $b$ such that for all fixed $x$ the relation $R(x, b)$ holds.

(II) Standardization

\[
\forall^\text{st} A \exists^\text{st} B \forall^\text{st} x (x \in B \iff x \in A \land \varphi(x))
\]  \hspace{1cm} (5.49)

for every st-\(\in\)-formula $\varphi$ with arbitrary (internal) parameters.

(III) Transfer

\[
\forall^\text{st} y_1, \ldots, y_n \forall^\text{st} x [\varphi(x, y_1, \ldots, y_n)] \Rightarrow \forall x \varphi(x, y_1, \ldots, y_n)
\]  \hspace{1cm} (5.50)

for all internal $\varphi(x, y_1, \ldots, y_n)$.

Remark 5.3. An important consequence of (I) is the principle of External Induction, which states that for any (external or internal) formula $\varphi$, one has
φ(0) ∧ [∀^st n(φ(n) → φ(n + 1))] → ∀^st nφ(n) \tag{5.51}

\textbf{Boundedness}

∀x∃^st y(x ∈ y) \tag{5.52}

and since (2.5) contradicts idealization the following (bounded) form is taken instead:

\section*{(IV) Bounded Idealization}

For every \( \in - \text{formula } R \):

\[ ∀^st Y \left[ ∀^st \text{fin } F∃y ∈ Y(∀x ∈ FR(x,y) ⇔ ∃b (b ∈ Y) ∀^st xR(x,b)) \right] \tag{5.53} \]

This gives a subsystem BST, which corresponds to the bounded sets of IST.

\subsection*{5.1 Internal set theory IST\#}

The axiomatics IST\# formulates within infinitary first-order language the behaviour of standard and internal sets of a nonstandard model of NC\#\(_\infty\). This done by adding the unary standardness predicate "st" to the language of NC\#\(_\infty\) as well as adding to the axioms of NC\#\(_\infty\) three new axiom schemes involving the predicate "st":

\textbf{Idealization, Standardization, Transfer and Axiom of internal hyper infinite induction.}

\textbf{Remark 5.4.} Formulas which do not use the predicate \( \text{st} \) are called internal formulas (or \( \in_{\text{st}} \)-formulas) and formulas that use this new predicate are called external formulas (or \( \text{st}-\in_{\text{st}} \)-formulas). A formula \( φ \) is standard if only standard constants occur in \( φ \).

\textbf{Abbreviaion 5.3.} We write \( \text{fin}(x) \) meaning '\( x \) is finite'.

Let \( φ(x) \) be a \( \text{st}-\in_{\text{st}} \)-formula:

1. \( ∀^st xφ(x) \) abbreviates \( ∀x(φ(x) \iff s^\text{st}φ(x)) \).
2. \( ∀^st xφ(x) \) abbreviates \( ∀x(φ(x) \iff s^\text{st}φ(x)) \).
3. \( ∃^st xφ(x) \) abbreviates \( ∃x(φ(x) \land φ(x)) \).
4. \( ∀^\text{fin} xφ(x) \) abbreviates \( ∀x(φ(x) \iff s^\text{fin}φ(x)) \).
5. \( ∃^\text{fin} xφ(x) \) abbreviates \( ∃x(φ(x) \land φ(x)) \).
6. \( ∃^\text{finite} xφ(x) \) abbreviates \( ∃x(φ(x) \land φ(x)) \).
7. \( ∀^\text{finite} xφ(x) \) abbreviates \( ∀x(φ(x) \land φ(x)) \).
8. \( ∀^\text{finite} xφ(x) \) abbreviates \( ∀x(φ(x) \land φ(x)) \).
9. \( ∃^\text{finite} xφ(x) \) abbreviates \( ∃x(φ(x) \land φ(x)) \).

The fundamental axioms of IST\#:

\section*{(I) Idealization for classical sets}

\[ ∀^\text{finite } x∀^\text{finite } y∀^\text{finite } z∀^\text{finite } CL∄x,y,F \left[ R^{\text{CL}}(x,y) \iff ∃b CL∀^\text{finite } xR^{\text{CL}}(x,b) \right] \tag{5.54} \]

for any internal classical relation \( R^{\text{CL}}(x,y) \).

\textbf{Remark 5.5.} The idealization axiom obviously states that saying that for any fixed classical finite set \( F \) there is a classical \( y \) such that \( R^{\text{CL}}(x,y) \) holds for all classical \( x \in F \) is the same as saying that there is a classical \( b \) such that for all fixed classical \( x \) the classical relation \( R^{\text{CL}}(x,b) \) holds.

\section*{(II) Standardization for classical sets}

\[ ∀^\text{finite } A∄^\text{finite } B∄^\text{finite } CL∀^\text{finite } x\in B \iff ∃x ∈ A \land φ(x) \tag{5.55} \]

\[ ∀^\text{finite } A∄^\text{finite } B∄^\text{finite } CL∀^\text{finite } x\in B \iff ∃x ∈ A \land φ(x) \tag{5.55} \]
for every st-∈-formula φ with arbitrary (internal) parameters.

(III) Transfer for classical sets

\[ \forall x^\text{CL} \exists y^\text{CL} (x \in y) \]

for all internal formulas φ(x, y).

Boundedness

\[ \forall x^\text{CL} \exists y^\text{CL} (x \in y) \]

and since (5.10) contradicts idealization the following (bounded) form is taken instead:

(IV) Bounded Idealization for classical sets

For every ∈-formula \( R_n \):

\[ \forall x^\text{CL} \exists y^\text{CL} (x \in y) \]

Remark 5.6. The idealization axiom obviously states that saying that for any fixed nonclassical finite set \( F \) there is a classical \( y \) such that \( R(x,y) \) holds for all classical \( x \in F \) is the same as saying that there is a classical \( b \) such that for all fixed classical \( x \) the nonclassical relation \( R(x,b) \) holds.

(V) Idealization for nonclassical sets

\[ \forall x^\text{NCL} \exists y^\text{NCL} (x \in y) \]

for any internal nonclassical relation \( R^\text{NCL}(x,y) \).

(VI) Standardization for nonclassical sets

\[ \forall x^\text{NCL} \exists y^\text{NCL} (x \in y) \]

for every st-∈,w-formula \( \varphi(x) \) with arbitrary (internal) parameters.

(VII) Transfer for nonclassical sets

\[ \forall x^\text{NCL} \exists y^\text{NCL} (x \in y) \]

for all internal \( \varphi(x, y_1, ..., y_n) \).

Boundedness for nonclassical sets

\[ \forall x^\text{NCL} \exists y^\text{NCL} (x \in y) \]

since (5.15) contradicts idealization the following (bounded) form is taken instead:

(VIII) Bounded Idealization for nonclassical sets

For every ∈,w-formula \( R \):

\[ \forall x^\text{NCL} \exists y^\text{NCL} (x \in y) \]
∀s;w
NCL
[(∀s;w,x
NCL
(x ∈ F) R(x,y) ⇐⇒ ∃y
NCL
(b ∈ Y) ∀s;w,xR(x,b))].

(5.63)

(IX) Internal Induction

∀S (S ⊂ s
N
#)
\left\{ \forall \beta (\beta \in \mathbb{N}^\#) \left[ \bigwedge_{0 \leq \alpha < \beta} (\alpha \in_s S \implies \alpha^+ \in_s S) \right] \implies s = s \mathbb{N}^\# \right\}.

(5.64)

The main restricted rules of conclusion.
If IST\# ⊢ A then \neg A \not\in B\#, where B \in \# .

Thus if statement A holds in IST\# we cannot obtain from \neg A any formula B whatsoever.

6 External Set Theory HST

6.1 External set theory HST

A "perfect" external set theory (a nonstandard set theory that includes external sets) should satisfy some requirements:

(I) It should be a conservative extension of classical mathematics (usually ZFC) so that all classical mathematical theorems and constructions remain valid.

(II) The theory should also allow to perform nonstandard constructions in its full generality and therefore include a strong version of saturation (called idealization in IST and bounded idealization in BST) and transfer principles.

(III) Finally it should allow to build, for any given set, the standard set of all its standard elements. This is called standardization. This means that ideally it should be something like an extension of IST allowing external sets and quantification over external formulas. However, as pointed out by Hrbáček [10] such a theory cannot exist. In fact, the axiom of regularity cannot be extended to the external universe. To see that let \mathbb{R}^\#\infty denote the external set of infinitely large real numbers. Observe that for all \omega in the (nonempty) external set \mathbb{R}^\#\cap \mathbb{N}, one has \mathbb{R}^\#\cap \mathbb{N}\cap \omega \neq \emptyset . Additionally, if one wishes to formulate a nonstandard set theory with IST-style saturation 4 , the replacement axiom in the external universe contradicts both power set and choice.

Remark 6.1. To be of standard size means to be an image of the set of all standard elements of a standard set (In HST, a set X is standard size if and only if X is well-ordered ). To see that choice fails, let x be well-ordered by a relation <. Consider the class of all standard ordinals "Ord, well-ordered by ∈ . We use the theorem that whenever two sets are well-ordered there is an order preserving embedding of one into the other. Clearly "Ord cannot be embedded into x, otherwise "Ord would be a set. Then there is an embedding of x into Ord. In fact, to an initial segment of "Ord. This means that x is of standard size.
Remark 6.2. As a consequence, sets which are not of standard size cannot be well-ordered (see Theorem 1.3.1 in [13]). These results are known as the Hrbáček’s paradoxes.

The first problem is not in fact a "real" problem because the regularity axiom is given so that every set is obtained at some level of the cumulative hierarchy over ∅ as mentioned above and has no great impact on which theorems are true. This "nice picture" of the universe is contested by some mathematicians and a suitable anti-foundation axiom can be taken instead, see for example [18].

In [12] Hrbáček considered already two possibilities to avoid this. The first one was to lose both power set and choice for external sets, leading to the system NS₁. The second one was to lose the replacement axiom for external sets, which lead to his theory NS₂. A third possibility was developed by Kanovei [13]. The idea is to restrict saturation by a standard infinite cardinal in order to reinstate the power set axiom. This is a system of partially saturated external sets which modifies the system HST (described below), called HSTₖ. This may be a solution for many practical purposes but not a solution as a foundational system for the nonstandard methods.

The theory BST possesses an extension to HST, which formulates within first-order language essential aspects of the behaviour of standard, internal and external sets within a nonstandard model, much as in Hrbáček’s system NS₁. The system HST is conservative over ZFC and equiconsistent with both BST and ZFC.

A set in HST is called internal if it is element of a standard set (see also the "Boundedness" axiom).

Remark 6.3. Below we use (definable) classes, they only should be interpreted as abbreviations of formulas with sets. Two important definable classes in HST are the class of standard sets

\[ S = \{ x \mid \text{st}(x) \} \]  \hspace{1cm} (6.65)

and the class of internal sets

\[ I = x \mid \exists y (\text{st}(y) \land x \in y) \] \hspace{1cm} (6.66)

6.2 HST axioms

(I) Axioms for all sets.

The axioms of this group are valid for all sets. These axioms are similar to the respective ones of ZFC with the difference that in HST they are presented in the full language. This implies in particular, by the axiom of separation, that the theory HST deals with external sets; for example if \( X \) is standard and infinite, then \( \{ x \in X \mid \text{st}(x) \} \) is an external set.

1. Extensionality

\[ \forall X \forall Y (\forall x (x \in X \iff x \in Y) \implies X = Y). \]

2. Pair

\[ \forall a \forall b \exists A \forall x (x \in A \iff (x = a \lor x = b)). \]

3. Union

\[ \forall A \exists B \forall x (x \in B \iff \exists X \in A (x \in X)). \]

4. Infinity

\[ \exists X (\emptyset \in X \land \forall x (x \in X \implies (x \cup \{ x \} \in X)). \]
5. Separation
\[
\forall X \exists Y \forall x (x \in Y \iff (x \in X \land \varphi(x))).
\]

6. Collection
\[
\forall X \exists Y \forall x \in X (\exists y \varphi(x, y)) \implies \exists y \in Y \varphi(x, y).
\]

The power set, regularity and choice axioms of ZFC are not valid in general. This is because, as mentioned above, each one of these axioms (if considered in the full language of HST) leads to a contradiction.

(II) Axioms for standard and internal sets
In this group as well as in the next there are axioms which are not valid for all sets. The first axiom scheme states that all ZFC axioms, when restricted to standard parameters are valid in HST:

1. \(ZFC^{st}\).

This means, in particular, that the following are axioms of HST:

(a) Regularity\(^{st}\)

\[
\forall^{st} S [S \neq \emptyset \implies (\exists^{st} x \in S) \land (x \cap S \neq \emptyset)]
\]  

(b) Power Set\(^{st}\)

\[
\forall^{st} X \exists^{st} Y \forall^{st} x (x \in Y \iff x \subseteq X)
\]

(c) Choice\(^{st}\)

\[
\forall^{st} S \exists^{st} Y \forall^{st} x (x \in S \setminus \{\emptyset\}) [\exists^{st} z (Y \cap x = \{z\})]
\]

The fact that every axiom of ZFC restricted to standard sets is an axiom of HST means that the class \(S\) models ZFC.

2. Transfer

\[
\forall^{st} x_1, \ldots, \forall^{st} x_n [\varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n)] \iff \varphi^{int} (x_1, \ldots, x_n)
\]

where \(\varphi\) is an arbitrary closed \(\in\)-formula containing only standard parameters

This means that the universe \(I\) is an elementary extension of \(S\) in the \(ZFC\) language.

3. Transitivity of \(I\)

\[
\forall^{int} x \forall y [y \in x \implies \text{int}(y)]
\]

The next axiom states that the class \(I\) is regular. This means that sets in \(HST\) are built over \(I\) in a way similar to the Von Neumann hierarchy of sets in \(ZFC\) over \(\emptyset\).

4. Regularity over \(I\)
∀X ≠ ∅ ∃x ∈ X(x ∩ X ⊂ I) \hspace{1cm} (6.72)

5. Standardization

∀X∃^st Y(X ∩ S = Y ∩ S) \hspace{1cm} (6.73)

This axiom implies that the only sets consisting entirely of standard sets are of the form Y ∩ S, where Y ∈ S.

Axioms for sets of standard size

1. Saturation

If A ⊂ I is a standard size set then

\( ((∀X, Y ∈ A) \Rightarrow X ∩ Y ∈ A) ∧ (X ∈ A) \Rightarrow X ≠ ∅)) \Rightarrow ∩A ≠ ∅ \) \hspace{1cm} (6.74)

2. Standard Size Choice

Choice is available in the case where the domain of the choice function is of standard size. Let X be a set of standard size and F a function on X.

Then

\( ∀x ∈ X((F(x) ≠ ∅)) \Rightarrow ∃f(f(x) ∈ F(x))) \hspace{1cm} (6.75)\)

3. Dependent Choice

Any nonempty partially ordered set without maximal elements includes a nonempty linearly ordered subset (sequence) where any element has its immediate successor.

6.3 Nonconservative extension of the HST

6.3.1 External set theory HST#

I.Axioms for all sets

The axioms of this group are valid for all sets. These axioms are similar to the respective ones of NC^#∞ with the difference that in HST# they are presented in the full language. This implies in particular, by the axiom of separation, that the theory HST# deals with external sets; for example if X is standard and infinite classical set, then \( \{x ∈ X^{CL}\vert st(x)\} \) is an external classical set of the set theory NC^#∞#.

This means, in particular, that the following are axioms of HST#;

I.Axioms for a classical sets

(a) Regularity^{st} for a classical sets

\[ ∀^stS [S ≠ ∅ \Rightarrow (∃^stx ∈ S) ∧ (x ∩ S, S ≠ ∅)] \] \hspace{1cm} (6.76)

(b) Power Set^{st} for a classical sets
∀st X ∈ Y ∃st x (x ∈ Y ⇔ x ⊆ X) \tag{6.77}

(c) Choice for a classical sets

∀st S ∈ Y ∃st x \left( x ∈ s \setminus s \{\emptyset\} \right) \left[ \existsst z (Y \cap x = \{z\}) \right] \tag{6.78}

(d) Transfer for a classical sets

∀st x_1, \ldots, n (∃st x_n [φ (x_1, \ldots, x_n)]) ⇔ \varphi^{\text{int}} (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \tag{6.79}

where φ is an arbitrary closed ∈-formula containing only standard parameters.

This means that the universe I is an elementary extension of S in the NC_{∞,#} language.

(e) Transitivity of I for a classical sets

∀st x, y \left( y ∈ s x \Rightarrow s \int (y) \right) \tag{6.80}

The next axiom states that the class I is regular. This means that sets in HST^{#} are built over I in a way similar to the Von Neumann hierarchy of sets in NC_{∞,#} over ∅.

(f) Regularity over I for a classical sets

∀st X \neq \emptyset \existsst x (x \cap x X ⊆ I) \tag{6.81}

(g) Standardization for a classical sets

∀st X ∃st Y (X \cap Y = Y \cap S) \tag{6.82}

This axiom implies that the only sets consisting entirely of standard sets are of the form Y \cap Y, where Y ∈ S.

Axioms for a classical sets sets of standard size

1. Saturation for a classical sets

If A ⊆ I is a standard size set then

\left( (\forall X, Y ∈ A) \Rightarrow X \cap Y \in s A \right) \land \left( X \in s A \Rightarrow X \neq \emptyset \right) \Rightarrow s \cap X A \neq \emptyset \tag{6.83}

2. Standard Size Choice for a classical sets

Choice is available in the case where the domain of the choice function is of standard size. Let X be a set of standard size and F a function on X.

Then

∀st x \in s X (F(x) \neq \emptyset) \Rightarrow s \existsf(f(x) \in s F(x)) \tag{6.84}

3. Dependent Choice for a classical sets

Any nonempty partially ordered set without maximal elements includes a nonempty linearly ordered subset (sequence) where any ∈s,ω element has its immediate successor.
II. Axioms for a nonclassical sets

(a) Regularity\textsuperscript{st} for a nonclassical sets

\[ \forall S_N^{\text{NCL}} \quad [S \neq \emptyset \implies \exists x (x \in S \land x \subseteq S \neq \emptyset)] \tag*{(6.85)} \]

(b) Power Set\textsuperscript{st} for a nonclassical sets

\[ \forall x_N^{\text{NCL}} \quad \exists y_N^{\text{NCL}} \forall x_N^{\text{NCL}} \quad (x \in y \iff x \subseteq y) \quad (6.86) \]

(c) Choice\textsuperscript{st} for a nonclassical sets

\[ \forall S_N^{\text{NCL}} \quad \exists Y_N^{\text{NCL}} \forall x_N^{\text{NCL}} \quad (x \in S \land x \neq \emptyset \implies \exists z \in Y \land (x \cap z \neq \emptyset)) \quad (6.87) \]

(d) Transfer for a nonclassical sets

\[ \forall x_1, \ldots, x_n \quad \exists y \quad \varphi(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \iff x \in y \quad (6.22) \quad (6.88) \]

where \( \varphi \) is an arbitrary closed \( \in \) formula containing only standard parameters. This means that the universe \( I \) is an elementary extension of \( S \) in the \( NC_{\infty}^{\text{st}} \) language.

(e) Transitivity of \( I \) for a nonclassical sets

\[ \forall x \quad \forall y \quad (y \in x \implies y \in S) \quad (6.89) \]

The next axiom states that the class \( I \) is regular. This means that sets in \( HST^{\text{st}} \) are built over \( I \) in a way similar to the Von Neumann hierarchy of sets in \( NC_{\infty}^{\text{st}} \) over \( \emptyset \).

(f) Regularity over \( I \) for a nonclassical sets

\[ \forall X \neq \emptyset \exists x \quad x \in X \quad (x \cap s \subseteq X) \quad (6.90) \]

(g) Standardization for a nonclassical sets

\[ \forall X \exists Y \quad (X \cap s = Y) \quad (6.91) \]

This axiom implies that the only sets consisting entirely of standard sets are of the form \( Y \cap s \), where \( Y \subseteq s \).

Axioms for a nonclassical sets sets of standard size

1. Saturation for a nonclassical sets

If \( A \subseteq I \) is a standard size set then

\[ ((\forall X, Y \in A \implies \exists x (x \cap s = X)) \land (X \cap s \neq \emptyset \implies s \neq \emptyset)) \implies s \neq \emptyset. \tag*{(6.92)} \]

2. Standard Size Choice for a nonclassical sets
Choice is available in the case where the domain of the choice function is of standard size. Let $X$ be a set of standard size and $F$ a function on $X$.

Then

$$\forall x \in s,w X((F(x) \neq \emptyset)) \implies s,w \exists f(f(x) \in s,w F(x)))$$ (6.93)

3. Dependent Choice for a nonclassical sets

Any nonempty partially ordered nonclassical set without maximal elements includes a nonempty linearly ordered subset (sequence) where any element has its immediate successor.

7 Conclusion

Though the history of infinitesimals and infinity is long and tortuous, nonstandard analysis, as a canonical formulation of the method of infinitesimals, is only about 60 years old. Hence, definitive answers for many of its methodological issues are yet to be found. In 1960, Abraham Robinson, exploiting the power of the theory of formal language reinvented the method of infinitesimals, which he called nonstandard analysis because it used nonstandard models of analysis. K. Hrbacek argue for acceptance of $BNST^+$ (Basic Nonstandard Set Theory plus additional Idealization axioms) [20]. $BNST^+$ has nontrivial consequences for standard set theory; for example, it implies existence of inner models with measurable cardinals. It has been proved in [21]-[22] that any set theory which implies existence of inner models with measurable cardinals is inconsistent. However hyper Infinitary first-order logic $2L^\#_{\omega\omega}$ with restricted rules of conclusions obviously can save $BNST^+$ from a triviality.

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Competing Interests

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Appendix

A. Bivalent Hyper Infinitary first-order logic $2L^{#}_{\infty}$ with restricted rules of conclusions. Generalized Deduction Theorem

Hyper infinitary language $L^{#}_{\infty}$ are defined according to the length of hyper infinitary conjunctions/disjunctions as well as quantification it allows. In that way, assuming a supply of $\kappa < \aleph_{0}^{#} = \text{card}(N^{#})$ variables to be interpreted as ranging over a nonempty domain, one includes in the inductive definition of formulas an infinitary clause for conjunctions and disjunctions, namely, whenever the hypernaturals indexed hyper infinite sequence $\{A_{\alpha}\}_{\alpha < \kappa}$ of formulas has length less than $\kappa$, one can form the hyperfinite conjunction/disjunction of them to produce a formula. Analogously, whenever an hypernaturals indexed sequence of variables has length less than $\lambda$, one can introduce one of the quantifiers $\forall$ or $\exists$ to together with the sequence of variables in front of a formula to produce a new formula. One also stipulates that the length of any well-formed formula is less than $\aleph_{0}^{#}$ itself.

The syntax of bivalent hyper infinitary first-order logics $2L^{#}_{\infty}$ consists of a ordered set of sorts and a set of function and relation symbols, these latter together with the corresponding type, which is a subset with less than $\aleph_{0}^{#} = \text{card}(N^{#})$ many sorts. Therefore, we assume that our signature may contain relation and function symbols on $\gamma < \aleph_{0}^{#}$ many variables, and we suppose there is a supply of $\kappa < \aleph_{0}^{#}$ many fresh variables of each sort. Terms and atomic formulas are defined as usual, and general formulas are defined inductively according to the following rules.

If $\phi, \psi, \{\phi_{\alpha} : \alpha < \gamma\}$ (for each $\gamma < \kappa$) are formulas of $L^{#}_{\infty}$, the following are also formulas:

(i) $\land_{\alpha < \gamma} \phi_{\alpha}$, $\land_{\alpha \leq \gamma} \phi_{\alpha}$,
(ii) $\lor_{\alpha < \gamma} \phi_{\alpha}$, $\lor_{\alpha \leq \gamma} \phi_{\alpha}$,
(iii) $\phi \rightarrow \psi, \phi \land \psi, \phi \lor \psi, \neg \phi$,
(iv) $\land_{\alpha < \gamma} x_{\alpha} \phi$ (also written $\forall x_{\alpha} \phi$ if $x_{\alpha} = \{x_{\alpha} : \alpha < \gamma\}$),
(v) $\lor_{\alpha < \gamma} x_{\alpha} \phi$ (also written $\exists x_{\alpha} \phi$ if $x_{\alpha} = \{x_{\alpha} : \alpha < \gamma\}$),
(vi) the statement $\land_{\alpha < \gamma} \phi_{\alpha}$ holds if and only if for any $\alpha$ such that $\alpha < \gamma$ the statement holds $\phi_{\alpha}$,
(vii) the statement $\lor_{\alpha < \gamma} \phi_{\alpha}$ holds if and only if there exist $\alpha$ such that $\alpha < \gamma$ the statement holds $\phi_{\alpha}$.

Definition 1.[19]. A valuation of a syntactic system is a function that as signs $\top$ (true) to some of its sentences, and/or $\bot$ (false) to some of its sentences. Precisely, a valuation maps a nonempty subset of the set of sentences into the set $\{\top, \bot\}$.

We call a valuation bivalent iff it maps all the sentences into $\{\top, \bot\}$.

Definition 2.[19]. Let $L$ be a propositional language. $L$ is a classical bivalent propositional language iff its admissible valuations are the functions $v$ such that for all sentences $A, B$ of $L$ the following properties hold

(a) $v(A) \in \{\top, \bot\}$
(b) $v(\neg A) = \top$ iff $v(A) = \bot$
(c) $v(A \land B) = \top$ if $v(A) = v(B) = \top$.
(d) by definition of the classical implication $A \implies B$ the following truth table holds.

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\(v(A) \quad v(B) \quad v(A \implies B)\)

(1) \(\top \quad \top \quad \top\)
(2) \(\top \quad \bot \quad \bot\)
(3) \(\bot \quad \top \quad \top\)
(4) \(\bot \quad \bot \quad \top\)

Truth table 1.

**Remark 1.** Note that in the case (4) on a truth table 1.

In this case we call implication \(A \implies B\) a weak implication and abbreviate

\[ A \implies \wedge \]

We call a statement (1) as a weak statement and often abbreviate \(v(A \implies B) = \top\) instead (1).

**Definition 3.** \[19\]. \(A\) is a valid (logically valid) sentence (in symbols, \(\models A\)) in \(L\) iff every admissible valuation of \(L\) satisfies \(A\).

The axioms of hyper infinitary first-order logic \(\mathcal{L}_{\infty,\omega}^2\) consist of the following schemata:

**I. Logical axiom**

A 1. \(A \implies [B \implies A]\)

A 2. \([A \implies [B \implies C]] \implies [[A \implies B] \implies [A \implies C]]\)

A 3. \([-B \implies \neg A] \implies [A \implies B]\)

A 4. \([\bigwedge_{i < \alpha}[A_i] \implies [A \implies \bigwedge_{i < \alpha} A_i], \alpha \in \mathbb{N}_\#\]

A 5. \([\bigwedge_{i < \alpha} A_i] \implies A_j, \alpha \in \mathbb{N}_\#\]

A 6. \([\forall x[A \implies B] \implies [A \implies \forall x B]]\) provided no variable in \(x\) occurs free in \(A\); \(\forall x A(x) \rightarrow S_f(A)\), where \(S_f(A)\) is a substitution based on a function \(f\) from \(x\) to the terms of the language; in particular:

A 7'. \(\forall x_i[A(x_i)] \implies A(t)\) is a wff of \(\mathcal{L}_{\infty,\omega}^2\) and \(t\) is a term of \(\mathcal{L}_{\infty,\omega}^2\) that is free for \(x_i\) in \(A(x_i)\). Note here that \(t\) may be identical with \(x_i\); so that all wffs \(\forall x_i A \implies A\) are axioms by virtue of axiom (7), see [19].

A 8.Gen (Generalization).

\(\forall x_i B\) follows from \(B\).

**II. Restricted rules of conclusion.**

Let \(\mathbf{wff}\) be a set of the all closed wffs of \(\mathcal{L}_{\infty,\omega}^2\).

**R1.RMP (Restricted Modus Ponens).**

There exist subsets \(\Delta_1, \Delta_2 \subset \mathbf{wff}\) such that the following rules are satisfied.

From \(A\) and \(A \implies B\), conclude \(B\) iff \(A \notin \Delta_1\) and \((A \implies B) \notin \Delta_2\), where \(\Delta_1, \Delta_2 \subset \mathbf{wff}\).

In particular for any \(A, B \in \mathbf{wff}: A \implies \wedge B \in \Delta_2\).

If \(A \notin \Delta_1\) and \((A \implies B) \notin \Delta_2\) we also abbreviate by \(A, A \implies B \vdash_{RMP} B\).

**R2.RMT (Restricted Modus Tollens)**

There exist subsets \(\Delta'_1, \Delta'_2 \subset \mathbf{wff}\) such that the following rules are satisfied.

\(P \implies Q, \neg Q \vdash_{RMT} \neg P\) iff \(P \notin \Delta'_1\) and \((P \implies Q) \notin \Delta'_2\), where \(\Delta'_1, \Delta'_2 \subset \mathbf{wff}\).

**Remark 2.** Note that RMP and RMT easily prevent any paradoxes of naive Cantor set theory (NC), see [4]-[6].
III. Additional derived rule of conclusion.

**Particularization rule (RPR)**
Remind that canonical unrestricted particularization rule (UPR) reads

**UPR:** If \( t \) is free for \( x \) in \( B(x) \), then \( \forall x [B(x)] \vdash B(t) \), see [19].

**Proof.** From \( \forall x [B(x)] \) and the instance \( \forall x [B(x)] \Rightarrow B(t) \) of axiom (A7), we obtain \( B(t) \) by unrestricted modus ponens rule.

Since \( x \) is free for \( x \) in \( B(x) \), a special case of unrestricted particularization rule is: \( \forall x B \vdash B \).

**Definition 4.** Any formal theory \( L \) with a hyper infinitary language \( L_\infty^\# \) is defined when the following conditions are satisfied:

1. A hyper infinite set of symbols is given as the symbols of \( L \). A finite or hyperfinite sequence of symbols of \( L \) is called an expression of \( L \).
2. There is a subset of the set of expressions of \( L \) called the set of well formed formulas (wffs) of \( L \). There is usually an effective procedure to determine whether a given expression is a wff.
3. There is a set of wffs called the set of axioms of \( L \). Most often, one can effectively decide whether a given wff is an axiom; in such a case, \( L \) is called an axiomatic theory.
4. There is a finite set \( R_1, ..., R_n \), of relations among wffs, called rules of conclusion. For each \( R_i \), there is a unique positive integer \( j \) such that, for every set of \( j \) wffs and each wff \( B \), one can effectively decide whether the given \( j \) wffs are in the relation \( R_i \) to \( B \), and, if so, \( B \) is said to follow from or to be a direct consequence of the given wffs by virtue of \( R_j \).

**Definition 5.** A proof in \( L \) is a finite or hyperfinite sequence \( B_1, ..., B_k, k \in \mathbb{N}^\# \) of wffs such that for each \( i \), either \( B_i \) is an axiom of \( L \) or \( B_i \) is a direct consequence of some of the preceding wffs in the sequence by virtue of one of the rules of inference of \( L \).

**Definition 6.** A theorem of \( L \) is a wff \( B \) of \( Y \) such that \( B \) is the last wff of some proof in \( L \). Such a proof is called a proof of \( B \) in \( L \).

**Definition 7.** A wff \( E \) is said to be a consequence in \( L \) of a set of \( \Gamma \) of wffs if and only if there is a finite or hyperfinite sequence \( B_1, ..., B_k, k \in \mathbb{N}^\# \) of wffs such that \( E \) is \( B_k \) and, for each \( i \), either \( B_i \) is an axiom or \( B_i \) is in \( \Gamma \), or \( B_i \) is a direct consequence of some of the preceding wffs in the sequence. Such a sequence is called a proof (or deduction) \( E \) from \( \Gamma \). The members of \( \Gamma \) are called the hypotheses or premisses of the proof.

We use \( \vdash E \) as an abbreviation for \( E \) as a consequence of \( \Gamma \).

In order to avoid confusion when dealing with more than one theory, we write \( \Gamma \vdash_L E \), adding the subscript \( L \) to indicate the theory in question.

If \( \Gamma \) is a finite or hyperfinite set \( \{H_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq m}, m \in \mathbb{N}^\# \) we write \( H_1, ..., H_m \vdash E \) instead of \( \{H_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq m} \vdash E \).

**Lemma 1.** [19]. \( \vdash B \iff B \) for all wffs \( B \).

**Theorem 1.** (Generalized Deduction Theorem1). If \( \Gamma \) is a set of wffs and \( B \) and \( E \) are wffs, and \( \Gamma, B \vdash E \), then \( \Gamma \vdash B \Rightarrow \vdash E \). In particular, if \( B \vdash E \) then \( \vdash B \Rightarrow \vdash E \).

**Proof.** Let \( E_1, ..., E_n, n \in \mathbb{N}^\# \) be a proof of \( E \) form \( \Gamma \cup \{B\} \), where \( E_0 \) is \( E \).

Let us prove, by hyperfinite induction on \( j \), that \( \Gamma \vdash B \Rightarrow \vdash E_j \) for \( 1 \leq j \leq n \).
First of all, $E_1$ must be either in $\Gamma$ or an axiom of $L$ or $B$ itself.

By axiom schema A1, $E_1 \implies s(\Gamma \implies sE_1)$ is an axiom. Hence, in the first two cases, by MP, $\Gamma \vdash B \implies sE_1$. For the third case, when $E_1$ is $B$, we have $\vdash B \implies sE_1$ by Lemma 1, and, therefore, $\Gamma \vdash B \implies sE_1$. This takes care of the case $j = 1$.

Assume now that: $\vdash B \implies sE_k$ for all $k < j$, $j \in \mathbb{N}^\#$. Either $E_j$ is an axiom, or $E_j$ is in $\Gamma$, or $E_j$ is $B$, or $E_j$ follows by modus ponens from some $E_l$ and $E_m$ where $l < j, m_j, and E_m$ has the form $E_l \implies sE_1$. In the first three cases, $\Gamma \vdash B \implies sE_j$ as in the case $j = 1$ above. In the last case, we have, by inductive hypothesis, $\Gamma \vdash B \implies sE_l$ and $\Gamma \vdash B \implies s(E_l \implies sE_j)$. But, by axiom schema (A2), $\vdash B \implies s(E_l \implies sE_j) \implies s((B \implies sE_l) \implies s(B \implies sE_j))$.

Hence, by MP, $\Gamma \vdash (B \implies sE_l) \implies s(B \implies sE_j)$ and, again by MP, $\Gamma \vdash B \implies sE_j$.

Thus, the proof by hyperfinite induction is complete.

The case $j = n \in \mathbb{N}^\#$ is the desired result. Notice that, given a deduction of $E$ from $\Gamma$ and $B$, the proof just given enables us to construct a deduction of $B \implies sE$ from $\Gamma$. Also note that axiom schema A3 was not used in proving the generalized deduction theorem.

**Remark 3.** For the remainder of the chapter, unless something is said to the contrary, we shall omit the subscript $L$ in $\vdash_L$. In addition, we shall use $\Gamma, B, E \vdash E$ to stand for $\Gamma \cup \{B\} \vdash E$. In general, we let $\Gamma, B_1, \ldots, B_n \vdash E$ stand for $\Gamma \cup \{B_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq n} \vdash E$.

**Remark 4.** We shall use the terminology proof, theorem, consequence, axiomatic, etc. and notation $\Gamma \vdash E$ introduced above.

**Proposition 1.** Every wff $B$ of $K$ that is an instance of a tautology is a theorem of $K$, and it may be proved using only axioms A1-A3 and MP.

**Proposition 2.** If $E$ does not depend upon $B$ in a deduction showing that $\Gamma, B \vdash E$, then $\Gamma \vdash E$.

**Proof.** Let $D_1, \ldots, D_n$ be a deduction of $E$ from $\Gamma$ and $B$, in which $E$ does not depend upon $B$. In this deduction, $D_n$ is $E$. As an inductive hypothesis, let us assume that the proposition is true for all deductions of length less than $n \in \mathbb{N}^\#$. If $E$ belongs to $\Gamma$ or is an axiom, then $\Gamma \vdash E$. If $E$ is a direct consequence of one or two preceding wfs by Gen or MP, then, since $E$ does not depend upon $B$, neither do these preceding wfs. By the inductive hypothesis, these preceding wfs are deducible from $\Gamma$ alone. Consequently, so is $E$.

**Theorem 2.** (Generalized Deduction Theorem 2). Assume that, in some deduction showing that $\Gamma, B \vdash E$, no application of Gen to a wff that depends upon $B$ has as its quantified variable a free variable of $B$. Then $\Gamma \vdash B \implies sE$.

**Proof.** Let $D_1, \ldots, D_n$ be a deduction of $E$ from $\Gamma$ and $B$ satisfying the assumption of this theorem.

In this deduction, $D_1$ is $E$. Let us show by hyperfinite induction that $\Gamma \vdash B \implies sD_i$ for each $i \leq n \in \mathbb{N}^\#$. If $D_i$ is an axiom or belongs to $\Gamma$, then $\Gamma \vdash B \implies sD_i$, since $D_i \implies sB \implies sD_i$ is an axiom. If $D_i$ is $B$, then $\Gamma \vdash B \implies sD_i$, since, by Proposition 1, $\vdash B \implies sB$. If there exist $j$ and $k$ less than $i$ such that $D_k$ is $sD_i \implies sD_j$, then, by inductive hypothesis, $\Gamma \vdash B \implies sD_k$ and $\Gamma \vdash B \implies s(D_j \implies sD_i)$. Now, by axiom A2, $\vdash B \implies s(D_j \implies sD_i) \implies s((B \implies sD_j) \implies s(B \implies sD_i))$. Hence, by MP twice, $\Gamma \vdash B \implies sD_i$. Finally, suppose that there is some $j < i$ such that $D_i \in \forall x_i D_j$. 42
By the inductive hypothesis, $\Gamma \vdash B \implies \sigma D_j$, and, by the hypothesis of the theorem, either $D_j$ does not depend upon $B$ or $x_k$ is not a free variable of $B$. If $D_j$ does not depend upon $B$, then, by Proposition 2, $\Gamma \vdash D_j$ and, consequently, by Gen, $\Gamma \vdash \forall x_k D_j$. Thus, $\Gamma \vdash D_i$. Now, by axiom A1, $\Gamma \vdash D_i \implies \forall x_k (B \implies \sigma D_j)$.

So, $\Gamma \vdash B \implies \forall x_k (B \implies \sigma D_i)$ by MP. If, on the other hand, $x_k$ is not a free variable of $B$, then, by axiom A5, $\Gamma \vdash \forall x_k (B \implies \forall x_k D_i)$ Since $\Gamma \vdash B \implies \forall x_k D_i$, we have, by Gen, $\Gamma \vdash \forall x_k (B \implies \forall x_k D_i)$, and so, by MP, $\Gamma \vdash B \implies \forall x_k D_j$, that is, $\Gamma \vdash B \implies \forall x_k D_i$. This completes the induction, and our proposition is just the special case $i = n$. 

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